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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The availability of risk capital in all its variants is a critical resource for a modern 
and adaptive economy. The effective exploitation of new knowledge requires a 
commercialisation process that is conditional on informed, skilled and risk 
accepting investors both as individuals (Business Angels) and professionals 
(Venture Capitalists). Similarly, the restructuring and reinvigoration of large 
established corporate businesses, often on an international or global scale, has 
been materially assisted by the advent of a finance industry focused on 
Management Buy-Out activity. 
 
In Europe, the provision and use of equity-based financing is both patchy across 
countries and materially lags behind the levels of development seen in the USA. 
Both inefficiencies in the supply of venture capital and in the demand from 
informed and growth-oriented entrepreneurs has resulted in parochial and 
nationally focused risk capital industries that are individually and collectively 
weaker than their US competitors.  
 
Global trends in both the provision by and demands of institutional finance 
seeking more and larger management buy-out opportunities, as well as the 
increasingly borderless identity of new technology paradigms, is threatening the 
relevance of Europe’s current, predominantly country-based model of private 
equity. There is a real need to develop a more pan-European private equity 
industry. 
 
In creating an Entrepreneurial Europe, policy makers need to recognise that: 
1. Business Angels are a fundamental and early building block of an innovative 
and adaptive enterprise community. For early-stage ventures, they are 
collectively more important than venture capital. The national fiscal 
environment should incentivise and reward risk taking by entrepreneurs and 
their early-stage financial backers. 
2. The fiscal environment should allow inter-country tax transparency. The 
costs associated with avoiding multiple taxation by private equity firms are a 
material barrier to a European market for risk capital. 
3. Government should work to encourage the involvement of private and 
commercial investors rather than seeking to substitute for their unique skills 
by acting as a direct investor of public monies into new enterprises. Where 
government supports ‘hybrid’ venture capital funds by co-investing, it should 
stipulate that such funds must be of a commercially viable scale. 
4. Governments themselves can be highly entrepreneurial. Yet, inter-country 
learning from both good and bad enterprise policy initiatives is poor and 
should be addressed by greater international contact between policy makers 
and academic experts. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this summary report we seek to give an informed view of two important roles 
of risk capital markets in Europe. First, we look at the region’s ability to provide 
risk capital for high-potential start-ups and young growth-oriented firms. 
Secondly, we examine the region’s ability to restructure, refinance and grow 
established firms into strong international firms capable of competing globally. 
 
The key roles of venture capital in the identification and growth of new 
enterprises are described, including present weaknesses in Europe. Similarly, the 
increasingly dominant influence of the European private equity industry on 
company (and increasingly industry) restructuring via management buy-out 
activity will be charted. Given the European policy perspective of this document, 
we will emphasise, where possible, means by which current market constraints 
or limitations may be resolved in order to ensure that high-potential businesses 
secure the appropriate finance and support to realise global opportunities. 
 
The terms ‘venture capital’ (VC) and ‘private equity’ (PE) are notoriously easy to 
confuse. We will therefore follow the convention of the European Commission’s 
Expert Group (European Commission 2006b). VC investors seek to identify and 
finance the rapid growth of high-potential young firms that embrace innovative 
products, processes or technologies, thereby generating substantial rewards 
from successfully overtaking existing business paradigms. In parallel, a separate 
but closely related management buy-out (MBO) industry seeks to identify 
established (but under-priced and/or inefficiently managed) target firms that 
may be purchased by professional investors prior to significant restructuring, 
refinancing and the eventual re-sale of the ‘revitalised’ businesses. Essentially, 
venture capital describes the provision of risk capital and managerial expertise 
to new enterprises while MBOs concern the commercial transformation of 
existing (and increasingly very large) businesses. Both sectors of the PE industry 
seek to make their investors’ medium-term returns substantially above the 
quoted market in order to reflect the substantial risks in these investments. 
 
2 THE ‘VIRTUOUS’ VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 
 
In order to understand the PE industry, it is necessary to recognise the dynamic 
cycle of risk capital investment and realisation. PE is an ‘alternative asset’ that 
institutional investors, including pension funds and insurance companies, may 
introduce to diversify their portfolios of established investments. Fixed term 
funds are created and run by professional management companies. These 
highly experienced executive teams, acting as the agents of the investors, invest 
in a portfolio of rigorously selected enterprises. The skill with which the 
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professional managers of VC or MBO funds can identify, add value to, and sell 
their chosen portfolio firms will determine their ability to raise future funds. 
Profitable exits are the single most important driver of the venture capital cycle.2 
 
The stages of this investment cycle also suggest the wide range of variables that 
influence the growth of a successful PE industry. As well as requiring informed 
providers of capital matched with experienced and professional investors, there 
needs to be a ready supply of attractive target portfolio firms able and willing to 
accept the strict commercial obligations of new sources of equity. These 
entrepreneurial firms must also accept the rigorous managerial governance such 
speculative investment demands. Venture activity needs to be undertaken within 
a transparent legal structure that is conducive to high risk, new enterprise and 
corporate transformations in a dynamic entrepreneurial environment. The 
institutional pre-conditions for a successful PE industry are not trivial. 
 
Figure 1  The virtuous financing cycle of private equity investment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EVCA 2005a. 
                                               
2 E.g. Black & Gilson (1999) Gompers & Lerner (1999), and EVCA (2005b). 
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3 NEW AND OLD WORLD DIFFERENCES  
 
The differences between Europe and the USA are simply put. America has built 
an innovation financing system, i.e. the ‘classic’ VC industry, which has managed 
to link world class scientific effort to the continuous production of novel, 
technology and knowledge-enhanced products and services. VC firms have 
facilitated the commercialisation of novel ideas and thereby have directly 
assisted in the creation of new sectors and industries of huge economic wealth. 
At the same time, the US innovation system has acted as a magnet for 
entrepreneurial talent from all over the world in addition to its home-grown 
entrepreneurs. The American model remains unique and is an exemplar admired 
by the rest of the world. While Europe has a number of centres of technological 
excellence it has not been able to replicate the US experience in VC. With a few 
exceptions, the investment returns to early-stage European VC investors and 
their ability to identify, nurture and grow a stream of world class companies has 
been consistently disappointing over the long run.3 However, Europe can be 
rightly proud of a growing MBO industry which, at its best, is world class. 
 
However, it would be a mistake to assume that future VC returns will inevitably 
mirror Europe’s brief and disappointing history. PE is a highly sophisticated 
investment activity with a significant learning curve for its professional 
participants. Further, the industry standard structure of 10-year closed funds 
has a strong ‘legacy effect’. A poor performance in the early years of an industry 
is likely to be similarly reflected in depressed performance figures for several 
subsequent years. Some recent evidence indicates better capital efficiency 
figures in 2004-5 exits in Europe compared to the United States.4 Thus, the 
widespread pessimism in Europe as to its ability to conduct successful early-
stage VC investments may be misplaced as a future prognosis.  
 
4 BIG IS BEAUTIFUL  
 
Small scale, country based PE operations are only stable so long as there are 
few benefits associated with the international or global scale. But the nature of 
professional financial services with its increasingly high levels of fixed costs - for 
example, the building of professional support networks or establishing a back 
office to ensure compliance with regulatory agencies - demonstrates very 
significant scale and scope economies. These imperatives operate both in the 
raising of new funds or in the realisation of attractive deals (this process is 
repeating the rapid global consolidation seen in industries as diverse as car 
production, banking and advertising). 
                                               
3 See e.g. Dantas & Raade (2006). 
4  See e.g. Fricke (2006). 
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There exists significant empirical evidence to support the performance benefits 
of size across the investment cycle including: 
 
• New fund raising 
• Key management recruitment 
• Management remuneration 
• Deal selection 
• Investment structuring 
• Investment syndication 
• Portfolio company support 
• Investment exits 
 
Yet, the single largest pressure on fund size has been the investment success of 
the PE industry itself and, above all, the exceptional performance in Europe (and 
latterly the US) of large management buy-out funds. Both median and upper 
quartile statistics have continuously shown very considerable margins over 
public stock performance. Only rarely have European VC funds been able to 
provide a performance comparative to their MBO peers. The consequence has 
been a continued and very marked preference by institutional investors world-
wide for later-stage funds.5 In Europe, this growth has been at the expense of 
VC investment. 
 
Table 1  European private equity performance (combining all data since 
records began). 
 
 
EU total return 
pooled, IRR 
Top 
Quarter*, IRR 
Upper 
Quartile, IRR 
Morgan 
Stanley Euro 
Index, IRR 
HSBC Small 
Company 
index, IRR 
Early-stage 0.1 13.6 2.3 4.2 10 
Development 9.2 18.8 9 8.4 10.3 
Balanced 8.3 23.7 8.5 6.3 9.9 
All venture capital 6.3 17.1 6.2 6.4 9.8 
Buy-outs 13.7 31.8 17.8 2.7 8.7 
Generalist 8.6 10.3 8.8 7.4 9.7 
All private equity 10.3 22.9 10.6 2.3 9.7 
 
Source: European Commission 2006b. 
                                               
5 See e.g. Coller Capital (2006). 
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5 GLOBALISATION OF THE PRIVATE EQUITY INDUSTRY 
 
There is, as yet, no European PE industry but rather a set of more or less 
country-based venture capital and management buy-out partnerships operating 
within their national borders and entrenched in domestic law and regulation. 
The absence of pan-European risk capital markets reduces both the growth 
opportunities of entrepreneurial firms and the effectiveness of local investors in 
relation to their international competitors. Yet, institutional investors are highly 
informed and have a large and growing choice of countries, sectors and 
management partnerships in which to invest. They have a preference for 
established funds and known markets with continuing attractive deal flow. As a 
consequence, the dominance of Anglo-Saxon economies in private equity 
(notably the US and the UK) is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.  
 
However, the integrity of this parochial, nationally defined structure is eroding. 
The single most significant driver of this change is the emerging globalisation of 
the PE industry driven by the implacable search for new and more investment 
opportunities.6 Internationalisation is important to both the VC and MBO 
industries but for quite separate reasons. We know that the best technology or 
knowledge-based young firms will rapidly seek to expand beyond national 
borders early in their growth trajectories. Increasingly, inputs or outputs in 
technologically demanding markets have little or no local characteristics or 
identity. The relatively short periods before new technologies are superseded 
further increase the urgency of internationalisation.  
 
This imperative to access wider markets for growth is particularly important for 
small and/or peripheral economies, e.g. Finland. Such decisions for aggressively 
expansionist young firms may raise tough choices about future ownership and 
legal identity. Research evidence suggests it is far more advantageous both for 
the firm and its host economy if subsequent growth is not frustrated by artificial 
legal constraints that block increasing international share ownership.  
 
In order to support the rapid growth and success of these expansionist firms, 
their VC investors must also be internationally located. This has seen the 
transformation of some investors into multi-national VC firms with offices in the 
key centres of enterprise activity. Other firms have encouraged international 
partnerships creating a network of co-investors and collaborators. Both demand 
and supply side factors are promoting a more global identity for VC firms and 
industries. 
 
 
                                               
6 See e.g. Deloitte (2006). 
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Figure 2  Business practices forecast to be deployed for global expansion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Deloitte 2006. 
 
The driving force behind the global expansion of PE lies in the huge increases in 
finance resulting from the recent investment successes of the management buy-
out sector. The search for under-performing corporate assets does not stop at 
national borders despite institutional and legal complexities. PE houses have 
increased their global reach in a search for more and larger deals. However, 
frictions in the functioning of the European single market based on the imperfect 
integration of national legal systems (many of which take little cognisance of PE 
activities) still hinder cross-border acquisitions and mergers. These barriers exist 
despite the quantified benefits of management buy-outs as a vehicle for 
increasing the growth, productivity and international competitiveness of 
European firms. 
 
As the PE industry has raised greater funds it has also had to be far more 
creative in the design of investment products in order to ensure the sufficient 
flow of productive investment opportunities. Investment managers combine 
portfolio companies from different local markets to achieve global scale benefits. 
‘Buy and build’ strategies in which cross-border transactions play an important 
role have become commonplace. MBO funds have sourced new partners at the 
highest level of executive talent in order to gain deep insight and industry 
knowledge in targeted sectors. From the original and rather passive buy out 
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product, professional investors are now capable of restructuring entire industries 
- on a trans-continental or global scale - given their purchasing power. With 19 
new funds over US$ 5 billion raised since 2000, the creation of $25 billion or 
even $100 billion funds is not inconceivable within the foreseeable future (Apax 
Partners 2006). Companies from the S&P large-cap market will no longer be 
immune because of size alone if performance is regarded by existing 
shareholders or entrepreneurial and knowledgeable investors as capable of 
improvement. There are fewer and fewer hiding places for poor managers 
under-utilising valuable corporate assets. 
 
6 BUSINESS ANGELS – INVESTORS OF FIRST  RESORT 
 
Both in the US and Europe, there has been a long-run increase in the size of 
initial investments that VC firms are prepared to make. Accordingly, accessing 
small amounts of seed capital for new and speculative enterprises remains very 
difficult in the so-called ‘equity gap’ area of EUR 0.5 to 2 million. As one US 
venture capitalist put it: “We do not do pocket money”. With more money to 
invest, the attractions of large, later-stage investments have grown. In 2005, 
according to industry statistics, the US and UK, the two largest PE industries in 
the world, undertook only a few hundred seed and start-up stage VC 
investments. Collectively, the two economies created over a million new firms in 
the same year.  
 
Table 2  US Comparison of business angel and venture capital investments.  
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 
VC investment (BUSD) 21.8 19.6 22.0 22.7 
Angel investment (BUSD) 15.7 18.1 22.5 23.1 
VC investee companies (#) 2 608 2 409 2 559 2 626 
Angel investee companies (#) 36 000 42 000 48 000 49 500 
 
Source: (Sohl 2006) and VentureXpert/PwC Moneytree as of September 2006. 
 
Thus, the reality is that professional VC investors are not going to resolve the 
equity gap. Yet, the US has continued to be an outstandingly entrepreneurial 
economy despite professional investors’ widespread disinterest in start-up firms. 
This is because of the existence of large numbers of experienced business 
angels and their huge impact, especially in early-stage deals (See Table 2). In 
the same year that US venture capitalists invested in 192 seed and start-stage 
companies (PwC/NVCA Moneytree 2006), US business angels invested in nearly 
50,000 companies, the vast majority being start-up and early-stage businesses 
(Sohl 2006). In the US, 227 000 active business angels were actively looking for 
investment opportunities and developing their portfolio companies in 2005 (Sohl 
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2006). Bygrave et al. (2003) argue that policy makers concerned with 
encouraging investments in new enterprises should redirect their energies from 
promoting venture capital to removing the barriers to informal investing. This 
advice is equally true in Europe. The encouragement and incentivisation of 
business angel activity should be a priority policy goal. 
 
7 THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS IN THE PRIVATE 
EQUITY INDUSTRY  
 
There is substantial evidence that, in the earliest and most challengingly 
uncertain areas of risk capital investment (i.e. seed and start-up finance), the PE 
industry has increasingly abandoned the field. Faced with this reality, the state 
has felt unwilling to leave a highly strategic area of policy interest to the 
vagaries of individual fund managers’ or private investors’ preferences. 
Accordingly, encouraging early-stage finance has become a major programme 
interest at both national and European government levels.  
 
Government has to be wary of intervening in a free market where its actions 
may ‘crowd out’ or frustrate commercial interests. The history of governments’ 
direct involvement in modern economies suggests strongly that public agencies 
should rarely intervene in commercial activities where they have little experience 
or skills. However, at the earliest stage of new ideas in advanced technological 
environments there may be a somewhat clear role for government support 
through, for example, meritocratic grants schemes. Pre-commercialisation 
stages of investment in areas of new knowledge are often so uncertain and 
delayed in their outcomes that exclusively commercial investment models may 
be inappropriate. 
 
Mindful of the disadvantages of displacing private activity, governments have 
become increasingly interested in the ‘equity enhancement’ or ‘hybrid’ model of 
public and private co-investment The involvement of government as one of the 
limited partners in such an early-stage fund may, through public finance 
leverage, assist the fund in achieving a minimum viable scale. However, the 
state has no executive role or influence on the operational autonomy of the fund 
managers. It sees its role as temporary and only valuable during the initial 
stages of infrastructure building. There is presently considerable interest in 
these hybrid models based on programme experience in several countries 
including the US, the UK, Germany, Australia and New Zealand. However, 
evidence of programme success is still limited, with little public evaluation. 
Nevertheless, it is very clear that the first and foremost role for governments in 
developing the private equity markets is to ensure a conducive and predictable 
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tax and legal framework that encourages the commercial operations of private 
equity investors.7 
 
8 CHALLENGES IN EUROPE 
 
We know from a recent review of research literature on the determinants of VC 
performance that both macro (economy wide) and micro (firm level) variables 
are important (Söderblom 2006). Macro level factors including stock market 
liquidity, sympathetic taxation regimes, pension fund rules, flexible and high 
quality labour markets, IPR protection and a flourishing Informal 
Investor/Business Angel community each have a positive and complementary 
impact. Similarly, at the VC firm (partnership) level, empirical studies suggest 
that fund size, managerial experience, stage and geographic focus, industry 
specialisation and syndication each have an effect on investment performance. 
We also know that when compared to the best US funds, European VC funds are 
generally too small, too generalist and too local in market ambitions. They are 
also frequently managed by investors with less specialist industry-technical 
experience than their US peers who are also more aggressively growth oriented.  
 
Despite the conspicuous success of the European MBO industry, its wider 
international penetration remains ‘patchy’. Major structural impediments still 
exist for institutional investors wishing to invest in European opportunities in 
several countries. The European Commission’s 2006 Expert Group on Alternative 
Investments noted that “national regimes do not interlink and are heavily 
fragmented”. Similarly, the 2006 Apax Report termed European regulation “a 
patchwork” of poorly integrated national legislation that seriously restricts the 
cross-border investment opportunities of PE firms and their institutional 
investors by increasing both the complexity and cost of such activities (Apax 
Partners 2006). A direct consequence of this absence of an integrated single 
European market for private equity is that the US continues to receive the 
majority share of new institutional investment in the private equity market 
despite growing investment opportunities across Europe. The lack of a European 
agreement on the principle of the mutual recognition of each nation’s fiscally 
transparent PE fund structures for capital gains (similar to that pertaining to 
public equity investments) is particularly singled out as a serious barrier to 
further investment. The spectre of institutional investors being vulnerable to 
multiple taxation liabilities in several national domains rather than solely in the 
home state of the investor was, in the opinion of the Expert Group, a major 
constraint on the growth of cross-border activity (European Commission 2006b).  
 
                                               
7  See e.g. EVCA (2004, 2005a). 
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9 WHAT’S TO BE DONE? EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In this concluding section, we attempt to make some sense and order out of the 
information, trends and analyses cited. We look at the major stumbling blocks in 
arriving at well-functioning markets for entrepreneurial finance and cross-border 
growth. Particular attention will paid to policy prescriptions to improve the 
functioning of the European single market for risk capital and efficient corporate 
control. We conclude that coherent national policies in support of a vigorous and 
growing entrepreneurial economy in Europe should include the following 
elements. 
9.1 Create tax incentives to stimulate informal risk capital 
 
Promote business angel investments to fill gaps in the supply of early-stage 
finance and support. There is a clear and persuasive argument for the greater 
promotion of business angel activity in all member states8. These informal 
investors remain one of the biggest competitive advantages of the 
entrepreneurial US economy. Their role is particularly important in supporting 
the genesis and growth of high-potential young firms, and as a complement for 
early-stage professional VC activity.  
 
Promote tax incentives to stimulate informal risk capital. Personal tax incentives 
have been shown to influence the investment behaviour of high net worth 
individuals.9 Revised legislation to enhance personal tax incentives is currently 
under discussion in several European countries and in the US Congress.10 
Several European countries and US states currently have such programmes.11 
The Pan-European “Young Innovative Company” (YIC) status allowing tax 
incentives to both young companies and their investors in member states is a 
European initiative that should be aggressively supported.12 
 
Complement tax incentives with other measures to stimulate informal venture 
capital. In addition to tax incentives, further support for infrastructure including 
the education and support of angels and the continued promotion of regional 
and national business angel networks (BANs) is needed. Existing network 
                                               
8 See e.g. European Commission (2002). 
9 See e.g. the evaluation of the Enterprise Investment Scheme in the UK (Boyns et al. 2003). 
10 H.R. 5198, the Access to Capital for Entrepreneurs Act of 2006 submitted to Congress in April 
2006 (See http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-5198). The proposed scheme 
would give a 25% tax credit for ”accredited investors” up to USD 500k qualifying investment per 
year with a limit of max USD 250k qualifying per company per year. See also Manzullo (2006). 
11  See e.g. CDVCA (2004) and EBAN (2006). 
12  See e.g. European Commission (2006a) and EVCA (2005a). 
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programmes should be reviewed and examples of excellence replicated (Sohl 
2006). 
9.2 Dismantle the barriers to cross-border investment  
 
Improve inter-country tax transparency. If a single pan-European fund structure 
is not presently feasible, then in the shorter term the mutual recognition of 
other European structures as tax transparent vehicles by member states is 
urgently required to facilitate further cross-border investment.13 Regulatory 
barriers for cross-border investments, mergers and acquisitions should be 
removed to reduce fragmentation of the European markets. The existence of 
such barriers represents a major hurdle to increased investment both within and 
into Europe, and reduces the growth potential of European businesses. 
 
Develop pan-European exit markets. PE and M&A industries cannot exist without 
attractive and open exit routes. Efficient, informed and large volume markets 
are a key driver of investment.14 Therefore, the development of such 
mechanisms is of crucial importance. National stock markets frequently fail to 
provide sufficient liquidity or the sophisticated investor base needed by many 
specialised technology-based companies. Therefore, more pan-European exit 
routes are needed including both IPO and trade sales channels.15 Regardless of 
its political sensitivity, Europe must provide unequivocal support for (at least) 
one European ‘small cap’ market of international importance in terms of the 
volume and value of transactions. 
9.3 Ensure that publicly supported funds are commercially viable 
 
The default public investment policy should be indirect. In the near absence of 
professional VC fund interest, and with several countries having under-
developed business angel activities, the state is often obliged to intervene in the 
earliest stages of the VC process. Evidence indicates that this can be 
accomplished most effectively if the state acts indirectly via the incentivisation of 
private and commercial early-stage fund managers to undertake more early-
stage investments. The ‘default’ policy stance for the state should be to fund co-
investment without direct operational involvement i.e. the financial support of 
professionally managed funds or fund of funds rather than the state assuming 
responsibility itself for direct investment activity.  
 
                                               
13  See e.g. European Commission (2005b, 2006b). 
14  See e.g. Black & Gilson (1999). 
15  See e.g. European Commission (2005a) and EVCA (2005b). 
  18 
Only support commercially viable funds. The state should also be mindful of the 
need for a sufficient scale of finance under management in publicly co-financed 
funds in order to ensure the best possible chance of a fully commercial 
operation.16 The setting up of state supported funds for other than strictly 
commercial objectives has been shown to result in few permanent benefits. 
Supported funds should be of a size capable of financing a portfolio of 
investments through successive rounds of growth finance to the exit stage. Any 
prospective fund seeking government support should be prepared to provide a 
testable business case supporting its commercial viability.17 
 
Incentivise larger funds to invest at earlier stages. The US experience shows 
that some of the largest, very early-stage (seed) investors are large and 
established VC funds. Such support for nascent firms in interesting new 
technology areas is seen as a necessary market intelligence and knowledge 
building requirement by fund managers. Large funds can invest in seed 
enterprises more cheaply than small, specialist early-stage funds as they incur 
only marginal costs. Accordingly, it is suggested that governments look at how 
later-stage European VC investors may be incentivised to invest in some early-
stage deals like their US counterparts. One further benefit of involving 
established VC funds is that it will also enable the industry’s most competent 
and experienced investment professionals to participate more actively in order 
to support the rapid development of early-stage ventures. 
9.4 Educate entrepreneurs, investors and policy makers  
 
Develop ‘investment readiness’ training. Improvements in the supply of finance 
to entrepreneurs are conditional on the growth of genuinely attractive 
investment opportunities i.e. professional and growth-oriented entrepreneurs. 
Investors repeatedly argue that the money would be available if sufficiently 
interesting investments were identified. ‘Investment readiness’ programmes 
seek to improve the quality of entrepreneurial proposals by educating 
inexperienced entrepreneurs. These initiatives directly address the major 
information imbalances between professional investors and those companies 
seeking their finance. 
 
Encourage inter-country programme learning. Advanced economies have 
continuously experimented in new policy initiatives to address age old problems 
in support for young firms. Yet, the means by which extant knowledge and 
experience is communicated between countries, both within and outside Europe, 
are limited. Inter-country learning often remains serendipitous and ineffective. 
We suggest that channels be set up between policy makers and specialist 
                                               
16  See e.g. Murray & Marriott (1998). 
17 The UK’s Enterprise Capital Funds have to meet this requirement in a competitive appraisal. 
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academic researchers, whereby existing policies and their outcomes may be 
identified, appraised and the ensuing lessons communicated to other interested 
groups internationally. The Norface Entrepreneurship Policy Research Seminar 
series is one current (and rare) example of such an academic/policy initiative18. 
 
Think internationally, act internationally. In the area of VC and PE activities 
where governments are expected to have a role or to offer support, 
responsibility should be placed on stake holders to address the implications of 
globalisation on present and future activities. Government departments involved 
in entrepreneurial finance, as well as VC and PE Industry Associations, and small 
business and entrepreneurial interest groups that seek government support 
should each be able to illustrate how they are responding proactively to the 
implications of globalisation on new enterprise formation and growth. 
 
                                               
18  See website  
http://www.norface.org/norface/publisher/index.jsp?1nID=93&2nID=94&3nID=201&nID=203 
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